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Bounded Rationality: Models of Fast and Frugal Inference
Gerd Gigerenzer1
Max Planck Institute for Psychological Research, Munich, Germany
Humans and other animals need to make inferences about their environment under constraints of 
limited time, knowledge, and computational capacities. However, most theories of inductive infer-
ences model the human mind as a supercomputer like a Laplacean demon, equipped with unlim-
ited time, knowledge, and computational capacities. In this article I review models of fast and 
frugal inference, that is, satisfi cing strategies whose task is to infer unknown states of the world 
(without relying on computationaly expensive procedures such as multiple regression). Fast and 
frugal inference is a form of bounded rationality (Simon, 1982). I begin by explaining what 
bounded rationality in human inference is not.
1. Bounded Rationality is Not Irrationality
In his chapter in John Kagel and Alvin Roth’s Handbook of Experimental Economics (1995), Colin 
Camerer explains that “most research on individual decision making has taken normative theo-
ries of judgment and choice (typically probability rules and utility theories) as null hypotheses 
about behavior,” and has labeled systematic deviations from these norms “cognitive illusions” (p. 
588). Camerer continues, “The most fruitful, popular alternative theories spring from the idea 
that limits on computational ability force people to use simplifi ed procedures or ‘heuristics’ that 
cause systematic mistakes (biases) in problem solving, judgment, and choice. The roots of this 
approach are in Simon’s (1955) distinction between substantive rationality (the result of norma-
tive maximizing models) and procedural rationality.” (p. 588) In the preface to their anthol-
ogy, Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky (1982) relate their heuristics-and-biases 
program to “Simon’s treatment of heuristics of reasoning and of bounded rationality” (p. xii). 
Richard Thaler (1991) explains that Kahneman and Tversky have shown that “mental illusions 
should be considered the rule rather than the exception. Systematic, predictable differences be-
tween normative models of behavior and actual behavior occur because of what Herbert Simson 
[sic!] (1957, p. 198) called ‘bounded rationality’.” (p. 4)
My fi rst point is to disentangle the confusion between bounded rationality (or procedural 
rationality) and irrationality inherent in these statements—a confusion which has been repeated 
many times (e.g., Oaksford & Chater, 1992; see Lopes, 1992). I use the term “irrationality” as a 
shorthand for the various “errors” and “fallacies” in statistical and probabilistic judgment which 
Camerer lists, such as the conjunction fallacy, the base rate fallacy, and the overconfi dence bias. 
In each of these alleged demonstrations of irrationality, the assumption is made that it is crystal-
1 I am grateful for comments on earlier versions of this paper by Bernhard Borges, Ralph Hertwig, Ulrich 
 Hoffrage, Timothy Ketelaar, and Laura Martignon.
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clear what the correct judgment is. Sound reasoning is reduced to applying a simple rule such as 
the conjunction rule or Bayes’ rule, without even looking at the content and context of the task 
(Gigerenzer, 1996a; Gigerenzer & Murray, 1987). Systematic deviations of human judgment 
from these norms (the “null hypotheses”) are called “biases” or “errors” and attributed to crude 
“heuristics”—representativeness, availability, and anchoring. What do these “heuristics and  biases” 
have to do with bounded rationality?
To start with, most of the heuristics and biases in statistical and probabilistic judgment that 
Camerer lists stem from the anthology by Kahneman et al. (1982), in which, as mentioned 
before, the link to bounded rationality is made in the preface. This anthology contains all of 
Tversky and Kahneman’s major papers since the early 1970s, none of which has a single citation 
to Simon. Given the normal care that Tversky and Kahneman take in crediting others, it is un-
likely that their research actually had its roots in Simon’s concept of bounded rationality (Lopes, 
1992). This leaves us with the possibility that there is, nevertheless, a deep link between the two 
programs which has just gone unnoticed for a decade or so. So let us examine how the heuristics 
and biases actually relate to bounded rationality.
For that we need some criteria for bounded rationality. To fi nd specifi c criteria turns out to be 
harder than it seems: initially, the concept of bounded rationality was only vaguely defi ned, and 
one could “fi t a lot of things into it by foresight and hindsight” (Simon, 1992, p. 18). I introduce 
four general requirements (rather than specifi c ones such as explicit stopping rules, see below), 
two related to each “blade” of the “scissors” that shape bounded rationality: “the structure of task 
environments and the computational capabilities of the actor” (Simon, 1990, p. 7).
(1) The task is too hard to compute an exact solution. In Simon’s (1979) words, “Satisfi cing [is] 
aiming at the good when the best is incalculable” (p. 3). To use one of his favorite examples, 
“If the game of chess, limited to its 64 squares and six kinds of pieces, is beyond exact com-
putation, then we may expect the same of almost any real-world problem …” (Simon, 1990, 
p. 6). There are two readings of the term “incalculable.” First, the task is too hard for the 
computational power humankind has available today, in minds and machines, such as in the 
case of chess. Second, the task is too hard for the limited computational resources the average 
mind has available.
(2) The task environment needs to be studied. The moral from Simon’s two-bladed scissors analogy 
is “that one must consider both the task environment and the limits upon the adaptive pow-
ers of the system” (Simon, 1991, p. 36).
(3) Limited cognitive resources. A person has to make an inference under limited time, limited 
knowledge, limited computational capacities, and limited resources for obtaining further 
information. These resources are insuffi cient to compute the exact solution.
(4) A satisfi cing strategy is specifi ed. This condition requires some precisely formulated strategy, 
which is proposed as a model of bounded rationality. This satisfi cing strategy computes a 
judgment or decision from the analysis of the task environment.
Do “heuristics and biases” satisfy these four general requirements? Consider fi rst a concrete ex-
ample, one of the most celebrated cognitive illusions: the “conjunction fallacy” in the Linda 
problem. Imagine you are a participant in an experiment; in front of you is a text problem and 
you begin to read (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983):
Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored in philosophy. As a 
student, she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice, and also par-
ticipated in anti-nuclear demonstrations. Which is more probable:
(a) Linda is a bank teller,
(b) Linda is a bank teller and active in the feminist movement.
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Assume you chose (b), just as some 80%–90% of the participants in previous experiments did. 
Tversky & Kahneman (1983) argued that this judgment is a reasoning fallacy, because it violates 
the conjunction rule:
p(A∩B) ≤ p(A), and p(A∩B) ≤ p(B).
In words, the probability of the conjunction of two events A and B cannot be larger than the 
probability of either of the two events. This alleged demonstration of human irrationality has 
been widely accepted and publicized. Stephen J. Gould (1992) puts the message clearly:  “Tversky 
& Kahneman argue, correctly I think, that our minds are not built (for whatever reason) to 
work by the rules of probability.” (p. 469) The conjunction fallacy has been suggested as a cause 
of many human misfortunes and disasters, such as US security policy (Kanwisher, 1989) and 
people’s assessment of the chance of nuclear reactor failures (Stich, 1985). Let us now see what 
this alleged demonstration of human irrationality has to do with bounded rationality.
(1) Is the task too hard? No. Different from chess and real-world situations, one does not even 
need a pocket calculator to compute (what is considered to be) the “correct” solution to the 
Linda problem.
(2) Is the task environment studied? No. No analysis of the situation is needed for the “correct” 
solution. One does not even need to read the description of Linda. Tversky and Kahneman 
(1983) assume that all that matters for sound reasoning is to map the term “probable” into 
mathematical probability, and the term “and” into logical AND. That’s all that is needed for 
the conjunction rule. The norm is content-blind, therefore the environment does not matter 
(Gigerenzer, 1996a). Any knowledge, such as about bank tellers and feminists, is considered 
irrelevant for sound reasoning. As a consequence, the participants’ assumptions about what 
the experimenter wants them to do are not analyzed either.
(3) Do limited cognitive resources apply? Limited cognitive resources are not an issue in the Linda 
problem. For fi nding the “correct” solution, absolutely no knowledge about the environment 
is needed and no resources for obtaining further information are required; thus the issue of 
limited knowledge does not apply. Similarly, little if any computational capacities are needed, 
and time constraints or information costs are of no relevance.
(4) Is a satisfi cing strategy specifi ed? The standard explanation for the “conjunction fallacy” is that 
people do not reason according to the laws of probability, but use a heuristic called “repre-
sentativeness”: The description of Linda is more representative of a feminist bank teller than 
of a bank teller. The term “representative” seems to mean “similar.” But which of the many 
different strategies for computing similarity is meant by this word? The strategy for comput-
ing representativeness has not yet been specifi ed.
I conclude that the conjunction fallacy and its proposed explanation, the representativeness heu-
ristic, satisfy none of these four general criteria of bounded rationality. This result holds more 
generally for the “heuristics and biases” in statistical and probabilistic reasoning (though occa-
sionally one of the criteria may be satisfi ed). First, what is considered to be the “correct” solution 
can almost always be computed with a few keystrokes on a cheap calculator (overconfi dence 
bias is one exception). Second, the norms are content-blind, therefore any analysis of the task 
environment is assumed to be unnecessary in the fi rst place. Third, for the same reason—con-
tent-blind norms—knowledge and information search play little if any role, and nor do limits of 
memory and attention. Fourth, none of the three heuristics proposed in the early 1970s—rep-
resentativeness, availability, and anchoring—has ever been turned into a precise model. They 
have remained one-word explanations with the virtue of Rorschach inkblots. Every researcher 
can read into them what he or she wishes. The reluctance to specify precise and falsifi able pro-
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cess models, to clarify the antecedent conditions that elicit various heuristics, and to work out 
the relationship between heuristics has been repeatedly pointed out (e.g., Einhorn & Hogarth, 
1981; Lopes, 1991; Shanteau, 1989; Wallsten, 1983). However, Kahneman and Tversky (1996, 
p. 585) still continued to defend undefi ned “heuristics” in reaction to critique (see Gigerenzer, 
1993, 1994, 1996a). Thus, by all four criteria, the heuristics-and-biases program has little to do 
with models of bounded rationality.
However, one could argue that at least the fi rst criterion holds in its weak version, which 
says that the solution is incalculable for the average person. Even if the task does not look dif-
fi cult, it is so for human minds, so the argument goes. And this result allegedly holds fairly stable 
across variations, as we learn from Camerer (1995). But this picture is misleading; it ignores the 
recent demonstrations of how to make the conjunction fallacy largely disappear (Fiedler, 1988; 
 Gigerenzer, 1991; Hertwig & Gigerenzer, 1996). Consider the simple fact that the term “prob-
able,” attached to a single event (such as that Linda is a bank teller), has several legitimate mean-
ings besides mathematical probability. Some examples are “plausible,” “credible” as in “a credible 
story,” and “that may in view of present evidence be reasonably expected to happen,” (see e.g., 
the Oxford English Dictionary). Similarly, statisticians of the frequentist school would not ac-
cept that single-event “probabilities” as in the Linda problem have anything to do with the math-
ematical theory of probability (Gigerenzer, 1994). Thus, for both psychological and statistical 
reasons, an adequate test of the human capacity to reason according to the conjunction rule is 
to state the problem in frequencies rather than in ambiguous single-event probabilities. Ralph 
Hertwig and I have formulated the Linda problem in terms of frequencies (Hertwig & Gigerenzer, 
1996). Everything was left constant except that we replaced the ambiguous phrase “Which is 
more probable?” by a frequency judgment: “There are 100 women like Linda. How many of 
them are (a) bank tellers, (b) bank tellers and active in the feminist movement?” In a series of 
experiments, conjunction violations dropped from almost 90% in the original probability ver-
sion to as low as 0% in the frequency version. Fiedler (1988) had earlier shown similar results: 
Violations of the conjunction rule dropped from 80% to 90% in probability judgments to about 
20% in frequency judgments.2 Thus, the task is not too hard for most people, once it is clarifi ed 
that it is about mathematical probability and not about something else.3
2 Note that Tversky and Kahneman (1983) had reported an effect of frequency for a different problem, but did 
not pay much attention to it.
3 The reason why most people chose to interpret “Which is more probable?” other than in terms of mathemati-
cal probability seems to be that the latter would imply that the description of Linda is irrelevant for the task, 
which in turn would imply that the experimenter violates Grice’s (1975) conversational maxim of “relevance.” 
This conclusion is supported by the task analysis, experiments, and paraphrasing tasks reported in Hertwig 
and Gigerenzer (1996). In other words, people’s judgments refl ect social rationality, not mental inability. In 
defense against my critique (e.g., Gigerenzer, 1991), Kahneman and Tversky (1996) constructed a between-
subjects design for the Linda problem, and claimed that at least in this special situation the conjunction 
fallacy is obtained even with frequency judgments. They asked one group “Suppose there are 1,000 women 
who fi t this description. How many of them are (a) high school teachers? (b) bank tellers?” and a second 
group “How many of them are (a) high school teachers, and (c) bank tellers and active feminists.” (p. 587) 
The estimate of (c) was higher than that of (b), which they took as a violation of the conjunction rule. Note 
that Kahneman and Tversky (1996) had changed in this experiment the original conjunction “bank teller 
and active in the feminist movement” into “bank tellers and feminists,” that is, a noun-active/adjective to a 
noun-noun combination. They did not point out this change. Hertwig (1997) has provided evidence that 
people actually tend to read the new formulation as a disjunction (rather than a conjunction), and that 
the “conjunction fallacy” in Kahneman and Tversky’s (1996) between-subjects design disappeared when this 
misleading formulation is replaced by the original conjunction. The problem with Kahneman and Tversky’s 
(1996) defense is the same as with their original analysis of the Linda problem: A content-blind norm is ap-
plied, and how people actually understand the task environment is not analyzed.
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The conjunction fallacy is not the only so-called cognitive illusion that largely disappears 
when probabilities are replaced by frequencies. Gigerenzer, Hoffrage and Kleinbölting (1991) 
showed that overconfi dence bias completely disappeared when participants were asked “How 
many of the last 50 questions did you get correct?” instead of “What is the probability that 
your answer to this question is correct?” (see also May, 1987; Sniezek & Buckley, 1993). Lay 
persons’ reasoning followed Bayes’ rule about three times as often when the information was in 
a frequency format rather than in a probability format (Cosmides & Tooby, 1996; Gigerenzer & 
Hoffrage, 1995). Physicians’ diagnostic inferences followed Bayes’ rule four times as often with 
frequency formats than with probabilities (Gigerenzer, 1996b; Hoffrage & Gigerenzer, 1996). 
Teigen (1974) reported that overestimation of probabilities (e.g., What is the probability that a 
randomly chosen female student at the University of Bergen is above 160 cm tall?) changed into 
more realistic estimates when subjects were given the opportunity to estimate frequencies (e.g., If 
we measure 500 female students, how many of them will be above 160 cm tall?). The difference 
between single events and repeated events also makes the “illusion of control” (Langer, 1975) 
largely disappear (Budescu & Bruderman, 1995; Koehler, Gibbs, & Hogarth, 1994), makes the 
certainty effect and the possibility effect (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) largely disappear (Keren, 
1991; Keren & Wagenaar, 1987), and reduces preference reversals (Wedell & Böckenholt, 1990). 
A review of the effects of frequency is in Gigerenzer (1991, 1994), and theoretical explanations in 
Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995) and Gigerenzer et al. (1991). For a different view see Kahneman 
and Tversky (1996), and for my response, Gigerenzer (1996a).
“Cognitive illusions” have been presented in the last three decades as hard facts similar to 
“visual illusions”—stubborn, largely ineradicable, genuine illusions, to which laymen and experts 
fall prey. The fact that one-and-the-same factor, frequencies versus probabilities, can make such a 
broad spectrum of alleged cognitive illusions largely disappear suggests that the tasks are not too 
hard, and the fault is not simply in the human mind. These results should not be read to imply 
that frequency judgments are always correct. There exist theories of cognitive processes that pre-
dict when they are and when not (Gigerenzer et al., 1991; Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995). But 
it should be clear that the single most trenchant conclusion reached by the heuristics-and-biases 
program, namely that people are all too bad at reasoning, is itself, to a large degree, an illusion 
fostered by all-too-narrow norms of sound reasoning.
To summarize: The study of bounded rationality has been recently associated with the search 
for biases, defi ned as systematic discrepancies from some rule of probability. I have stated four 
general requirements for bounded rationality and concluded that the heuristics-and-biases ap-
proach to human judgment has little to do with studying bounded rationality. The stock-in-
trade biases tend to disappear largely when the problems are formulated in terms of frequencies 
rather than probabilities.
The purpose of models of bounded rationality cannot be to explain deviations of human 
judgment from rules of probability. In the situations in which bounded rationality applies, the 
solution cannot be reduced to one of these rules. The purpose is to explain how people can do 
better than chance, that is, to explain deviations from random performance in the direction of 
successful performance.
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2. Models of Satisfi cing Inference
How can a mind infer unknown properties of its environment on the basis of limited knowledge 
about that environment? How can these inferences be modeled, assuming the constraints of 
limited time and computational capacities? I will consider models of satisfi cing inference that 
embody, in addition to the general criteria listed above, the following specifi c criteria:
– Step-by-step procedures
– Limited search (simple stopping rules)
– One-reason decision making (non-compensatory strategies)
– Exploitation of a lack of knowledge (how to make positive use of one’s ignorance)
– Exploitation of structures of information (structures of environments).
This paper deals with the following type of inference: Which of two objects scores higher on a 
criterion? This inference is a special case of the more general problem of infering which object in 
a class of M objects has the highest value on a criterion, but I will consider here only the case of 
M = 2. Examples are treatment allocation (e.g., which of two patients to treat fi rst in the emer-
gency room, with life expectancy after treatment as criterion), fi nancial investment (e.g., which 
of two options to buy, with profi t as criterion), and demographic predictions (e.g., which of two 
places has higher pollution, mortality rates, and so on).
Take The Best
Take The Best is a satisfi cing algorithm designed for problems of this kind, that is, for situations 
in which fast inferences have to be made about which of two objects (patients, alternatives) scores 
higher on some criterion (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996). The general situation is illustrated in 
Figure 1. There are N objects (a, b, c, …) and a number of predictors that have binary values 
(the situation can be generalized to continuous predictors, e.g., by dichotomizing). I explain the 




































































Figure 1.  Illustration of bounded search through limited knowledge. 
GG_Boun_1997.indd   6 17.04.2007   8:04:28 Uhr
Gerd Gigerenzer 7
study its performance: Which of two cities has a larger population? Here, a and b are two Ger-
man cities, say Bremen and Heidelberg. Examples of predictors that indicate higher population 
are soccer team (whether or not a city has a team in the major soccer league) and state capital 
(whether or not a city is a state capital). The predictors are ordered according to their (perceived) 
validity, with Predictor 1 at the top. The predictor values can be positive (a city has a soccer team, 
which indicates larger population), negative (has no soccer team), or unknown (the person has 
no information). The task is to infer which city, a or b, has a larger population. In addition to 
these ecological predictors, there is a subjective cue, recognition (whether or not the person has 
heard of the city). Recognition only plays a role when it is correlated with the criterion, as it is 
with population. 
Step-by-step procedure. Take The Best looks up in memory, step-by-step, information concern-
ing predictors, until a predictor is found that discriminates. Discrimination occurs when one 
object has a positive value and the other has no positive value (negative or unknown). How does 
Take The Best infer which of two cities, Bremen (a) and Heidelberg (b), has the larger popula-
tion, given the limited knowledge in Figure 1? First, the recognition values are looked up, which 
in this case do not discriminate, because both are positive. Next, the values on the top-ranking 
ecological predictor, the soccer team cue (Predictor 1) are searched. Bremen has a soccer team in 
the major league, but Heidelberg does not. Search in memory is terminated, and the inference is 
made that Bremen has the larger population. No other predictor values are looked up in memory. 
Thus, only 4 out of 12 values in Figure 1 (striped area) are looked up. None are integrated. Con-
sider now the inference, which of b and c has a higher population. The values for recognition and 
Predictor 1 do not discriminate, but those of Predictor 2 do. Thus 6 values are looked up (dot-
ted area in Figure 1) before search is terminated and the inference is made that b has the higher 
population. Finally, consider the inference, which of c and d is larger? Object c is recognized, d is 
not; that’s it. The inference is made that c has the larger population. The Take The Best algorithm 
is shown in the form of a fl ow chart in Figure 2.
Limited search. Take The Best operates by limited search with an explicit stopping (discrimi-
nation) rule. Its motto is “take the best, ignore the rest.” In contrast, “rational” inference, as 
traditionally conceived, needs to look up all available information. Take Figure 2.
The Best violates this tenet of classical rationality. The stopping rule makes the algorithm fast 
(search is quickly terminated) and frugal (only a few predictor values are used for the inference).
One-reason decision making. The inference is made by one predictor only; there is no inte-
gration and compensation of predictors. Take The Best is non-compensatory. For instance, the 
positive values of object b in Predictors 2 and 3 (Figure 1) cannot reverse the decision made solely 
on the basis of the higher ranking Predictor 1. In contrast, “rational” inference, as traditionally 
conceived, integrates all available information in some optimal way. Take The Best violates this 
maxim. One-reason decision making makes the algorithm computationally simple, if computa-
tion is sequential.
Exploitation of a lack of knowledge. Take The Best operates with the recognition principle: If one 
of the two alternatives is recognized, and the other not, then choose the recognized object. Note that 
this principle is non-compensatory. For instance, the three negative predictor values of object c 
do not reverse the inference that c is larger than d (Figure 1). The recognition principle can only 
be used when a person has a lack of knowledge (i.e., does not recognize one of the alternatives) 
and exploits this lack in environments where recognition is not random but correlated with the 
criterion. The recognition principle is the most frugal satisfi cing principle, because it feeds on a 
lack of knowledge rather than just limited knowledge. Its surprising power can lead to the coun-
terintuitive less-is-more effect, that is, that inferences based on less knowledge can be systemati-
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cally better than inferences based on more knowledge. The structures of environments in which 
less-is-more effects occur are described in Goldstein and Gigerenzer (1997).
Exploitation of structures of information (environments). The recognition principle can exploit 
certain structures of information (recognition correlated with the criterion). Similarly, Take The 
Best can exploit certain structures of information, such as exponentially decreasing weights of 
binary predictors (see below), which allows high levels of accuracy (Martignon, Hoffrage, & 
Kriegeskorte, 1997).
A Competition
Although Take The Best seems to refl ect what people actually do in many situations under con-
straints of limited time and knowledge, its simplicity raises the suspicion that it will dismally fail 
when making inferences about unknown features of real environments. For instance, when Kee-
ney and Raiffa (1993) discussed the lexicographic ordering procedure—a procedure related to 
Take The Best—they concluded that this procedure “is naively simple” and “will rarely pass a test 
of ‘reasonableness’” (p. 78). How could an inference based on only one predictor compete with 
one based on an integration of all information available? In order to test how accurate Take The 
Best is, Daniel Goldstein and I set up a competition between Take The Best and fi ve linear inte-
gration algorithms, including multiple regression (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996). The task was 




















Figure 2.  Flow diagram of the Take The Best algorithm (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996).
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with more than 100,000 inhabitants (83 cities) with nine ecological predictors. In order to simu-
late limited knowledge, we created millions of hypothetical subjects, each of whom had a differ-
ent amount of knowledge, by replacing actual predictor values with unknown values. For each 
of these subjects, the proportion of correct inferences (whether Heidelberg is really larger than 
Bonn) in all possible tests (83 x 82/2 pairs of cities) was determined using Take The Best. Simi-
larly, the proportion of correct inferences was determined using each of the fi ve linear integration 
algorithms. Competitors such as multiple regression computed inferences with the beta weights. 
The linear algorithms always based each inference on all information (predictor values), whereas 
Take The Best used, on the average, only less than one third of this information. The counterin-
tuitive result was that Take The Best matched every one of the competing algorithms in accuracy, 
including multiple regression, and performed better than some (Gigerenzer &  Goldstein, 1996). 
Figure 3 illustrates this result for the special case in which every algorithm performs best, that 
is, when the simulated persons have complete knowledge of predictor values for each city they 
recognize. Limited recognition is shown on the x-axis, from 0 to all cities recognized.
Note that the performance exhibits a less-is-more effect. For instance, the simulated person 
who recognizes all cities and has complete information about all values of 83 cities in 9 predic-
tors (at the very right of Figure 3) would make more accurate inferences if she had less complete 
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Figure 3.  Results of the competition between Take The Best and fi ve linear algorithms.
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of the recognition principle (which can no longer be applied when all objects are recognized), 
which is explicit in Take The Best and implicit in some of the linear algorithms (Gigerenzer & 
Goldstein, 1996).
This result is an existence proof that fast and frugal inference can be as accurate as computa-
tionally expensive algorithms that use more knowledge and time. But does this result generalize 
to other situations, or is there something peculiar with the population demographics of German 
cities? What is the structure of information in natural environments that Take The Best can ex-
ploit, and when would it fail? How do variants of Take The Best that are faster and more frugal 
perform?
Does the Performance of Take The Best Generalize to Other Environments?
We have simulated the performance of Take The Best in eight task environments, and compared 
it to the most powerful linear competitor, multiple regression (Czerlinski, Goldstein, &  Gigerenzer, 
1997). The tasks included predicting the mortality rates in 20 Los Angeles districts from 15 in-
dicators of pollution and demographic information; dropout rates in 57 Chicago high schools 
based on 18 indicators such as the average salary of the teachers and the proportion of white 
students; and attractiveness ratings of prominent men and women, based on three cues. These 
competitions were performed for the case of complete knowledge, that is, where the recognition 
principle (which exploits a lack of knowledge) could not help Take The Best. In four of the eight 
environments, the proportion of accurate inferences was the same for multiple regression and 
Take The Best, in two others multiple regression performed slightly better (1 or 2 percentage 
points), and in only two environments there was a clear advantage of multiple regression (6 and 
9 percentage points). The total proportions of correct inferences ranged between 65% and 84%. 
Thus, the striking performance of Take The Best did generalize. Equally important, there were 
systematic differences that provide clues for understanding why and when Take The Best per-
forms so well. 
What Structures of Environments Allow Take The Best to Perform So Well?
Martignon et al. (1997) have proven conditions under which Take The Best can and cannot be 
outperformed by a weighted linear model (with predictor-criterion correlations as weights). I 
summarize here the gist of their proofs. In environments with abundant information (i.e., where 
the number of cues is very large compared to log N, where N is the number of objects), weighted 
linear models perform better. Consistent with this proof, the two environments in which mul-
tiple regression had a clear edge in performance in the simulations were those where the number 
of predictors was large relative to the number of objects (such as 15 cues for 20 objects). In 
environments with scarce information (where the number of cues is small relative to the number 
of objects, defi ned as less than or equal than log N), Take The Best performs better on average. 
Finally, when the weights of binary predictors are exponentially decreasing, such as 1/2,1/4,1/8, 
and therefore are non-compensatory, no weighted linear model, including multiple regression, 
can outperform the faster and more frugal Take The Best.
In many situations humans must make inferences on the basis of scarce information. Envi-
ronments with strictly non-compensatory cue weights are also not uncommon. For instance, in 
2ˆ
2ˆ
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a study about people’s reactions to their experience with police offi cers and judges, Tyler (1997, 
Figure 2) reported the beta weights of three predictors (fairness of the procedure, fairness of the 
outcome, and favorability of the outcome) for each of three criteria: people’s respect of the law, 
their evaluation of the legal authority involved, and their personal feelings following the experi-
ence. For the fi rst two criteria, the sets of beta weights were strictly non-compensatory, and for 
the third, approximately so. Among the eight data sets that Czerlinski et al. (1997) analyzed there 
were three with strictly non-compensatory weights. Scarce information as well as non-compensa-
tory information is where Take The Best fl ourishes.
Can Satisfi cing Inferences Get by With Even Less Knowledge?
Take The Best uses information about the rank order of the validity of the predictors (as opposed 
to weighted linear models which use information about the quantitative validities of predictors). 
Assume that this rank order is not known, only the direction into which each of the predictors 
points (whether a predictor signals a higher or a lower value on the criterion). Two variants of Take 
The Best operate with this reduced information. They differ from Take The Best only in which 
predictors they look up fi rst. “Take The Last” tries fi rst the predictor that discriminated the last 
time; if it does not discriminate, then the predictor that worked the next to last time is examined, 
and so on. Take The Last works by a well-known psychological principle, the “Einstellung effect” 
(Luchins & Luchins, 1994) of Gestalt psychology. By contrast, the “Minimalist” just tries predic-
tors in random order. Neither of these two algorithms needs information about which predictors 
are better than others. How accurate are the inferences that these satisfi cing algorithms draw? For 
population sizes, Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996) showed that the accuracy of these two algo-
rithms was, on average, only about 1 percentage point less than that of Take The Best, and still 
higher than some of the linear models. Each of them stopped earlier than Take The Best, that is, 
searched for less information. The performance of these two satisfi cing algorithms was striking.
Take The Best is a member of a larger family, the PMM (“Probabilistic Mental Models”) 
family of satisfi cing algorithms (Gigerenzer, 1994; Gigerenzer et al., 1991). The closest relatives 
to Take The Best (but not to Take The Last and the Minimalist, which do not order predictors 
according to their validity) are lexicographic strategies and the classifi cation and regression tree 
(CART) models (Breiman et al., 1993). Different from lexicographic strategies, however, Take 
The Best does not produce systematic intransitive inferences.
3. Summing Up
When a person makes inferences about unknown states of the world under constraints of limited 
knowledge and time, she is typically not in a position to calculate the optimal solution, even if 
such a solution is attainable. Take The Best and its variants are fast and frugal algorithms that 
can draw inferences with a minimum of knowledge and computational effort. These algorithms 
are based on simple psychologically plausible principles. They violate two classical tenets of ratio-
nality: They do not look up all available information and they use one-reason decision making. 
Nevertheless, Take The Best can be as accurate as weighted linear models, and we can specify 
the structure of environments in which these satisfi cing algorithms do well. Models of bounded 
inference do not necessarily have to forsake accuracy for simplicity, nor rationality for psycho-
logical plausibility—the mind can have it both ways.
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Summary
I specify general criteria for models of bounded rationality and discuss specifi c models for sat-
isfi cing inference. The task of these fast and frugal algorithms is to infer unknown features of 
their environment under the constraints of limited knowledge, limited time, and limited com-
putational capacities. These algorithms violate fundamental tenets of classical rationality: They 
neither look up nor integrate all information. I review the performance of the satisfi cing “Take 
The Best” algorithm. Despite its frugality, Take The Best can make as many correct inferences as 
computationally expensive weighted linear models that use and combine all available informa-
tion. Accurate inferences need not follow the dictates of classical rationality.
Zusammenfassung
Ich formuliere allgemeine Kriterien für Modelle begrenzter Rationalität und diskutiere spezi-
fi sche “satisfi cing” Modelle für Inferenz unter Unsicherheit. Die Aufgabe dieser schnellen und 
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einfachen Algorithmen ist, unbekannte Eigenschaften der Umwelt zu erschließen, und zwar mit 
begrenztem Wissen, begrenzter Zeit und begrenzter rechnerischer Kapazität. Diese Algorithmen 
verletzen fundamentale Annahmen klassischer Rationalität: Sie suchen weder alle verfügbare In-
formation, noch integrieren sie Information. Ich berichte über die Leistung des “Take The Best” 
Algorithmus. Trotz seiner Frugalität kann “Take The Best” genauso viele richtige Inferenzen 
machen wie rechnerisch aufwendige gewichtete lineare Modelle, welche alle verfügbare Infor-
mation verwenden und kombinieren. Richtige Inferenzen müssen nicht den Regeln klassischer 
Rationalität folgen.
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